We prove that, with high probability, the space complexity of refuting a random unsatisfiable boolean formula in ¡ -CNF on
Introduction
The importance of studying the complexity of (propositional) proof systems comes from its close relationship with long-standing open problems in Complexity Theory such as NP =? Co-NP [5] . The complexity measure related to the classical notion of time is the size of a proof, viz. the number of lines used in the proof.
Recently Esteban and Torán [8] suggested a measure for the space complexity of refuting an unsatisfiable formula in a proof system called resolution (subsequent work [1] extended this notion to other proof systems). Although several results [1, 8, 13] are, by now, known on the space complexity of various classes of formulae, a quantitative analysis of the space needed to prove the unsatisfiability of random formulae has remained, until recently, somewhat elusive.
As a step towards the solution of this problem, we point out that a combination of a modification of the classical Davis-Putnam [7] algorithm and a polynomial time algorithm that produces a refutation for any given unsatisfiable 2-CNF formula, outputs refutations of any unsatisfiable random formula within the space bounds stated in the following Theorem. 
For sufficiently large 3 6 X 8
this bound "almost" matches a lower bound proved in [2] . The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce all relevant notations and technical results; in Section 3 we give full details of the proof of Theorem 1.1 for the case and in Section 4 we give all details needed to extend the proof to any fixed 
is a truth-assignment with domain Dom
The meaning of 
Using this result it is possible to analyse the space needed for refuting a formula through techniques used for bounding the number of pebbles used/needed to play ¡ . The following result is a consequence of Lemma 1.
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From this it follows immediately that space 
A technical result
A fundamental conjecture about
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[9] but only upper an lower bounds are known for ( C Ù (see for instance [11] ). The techniques used to derive these bounds turn out to be useful to prove the following result which will be used in the proof of Theorem 1.1.
, the probability that ' be satisfiable is at most
SS
, where Proof. Following [11] it is possible to bound the probability that the given random ( -CNF be satisfiable by the expected number of satisfying assignments that are maximal in the sense that it is not possible to flip the value of any single variable set to 1 and preserve satisfiability. This number can be computed resorting to the coupon collector's probabilities, as described in [14] . The resulting upper bound on the probability that 
We can rewrite
and therefore, using (1), the equation above simplifies to is very small. In the following we assume ' to be unsatisfiable. We will prove that it is possible to choose s o that RoughDLL ends with a "false" answer w.h.p. If this is the case, the refutation built using the algorithm in Section 2.3 is formed by joining the refutations for 
An algorithm
(where the last inequality holds as long as e h . More precisely, since the probability of satisfying a formula decreases as the number of clauses in the formula increases, the sought probability is at most: and the probability that 
Final remarks and open questions
In this paper we presented a class of refutations which can be associated with high probability with any given unsatisfiable random clauses. A pebbling game can be played on the directed acyclic graphs corresponding to these refutations and relatively few pebbles are sufficient to win such game. As a consequence of this an upper bound can be obtained on the space complexity of refuting unsatisfiable random ( -CNF formulae in resolution. The analysis presented might be tightened by using refined bounds [3] on the probability that a random 2-CNF formula on 
